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SENSE OF HUMOR AS A CHRISTIAN VIRTUE 
Robert C. Roberts 
Puritanism has been defined as the fear that somewhere out there somebody 
is having fun. John Morreall has argued that a sense of humor is incompatible 
with Christian belief. I The sight of Christians frolicking about like children 
at recess inclines some to think the Christians are finally becoming human. 
Such people have probably not read Chesterton or been to a Young Life 
meeting. Inside the Christian camp, we are often told (and for some reason 
we keep needing to be reminded) that Christianity is not a sour philosophy. 
Life is a matter of life-and-death, it is true, and Christians have responsibil-
ities; but also they can play and laugh; faith is (or should be) a liberation 
from despair and grief and guilt, a life of thanksgiving and joyful service. 
Sometimes, in this context, we are told that Christians should have a sense 
of humor. S"ren Kierkegaard even goes so far as to call Christianity "the 
most humorous view of life in world history."2 How does a sense of humor 
especially fit one for life as a Christian? What is there about Christianity that 
makes it especially hospitable to a sense of humor? 
The first approach that occurs to us is to list some Christian "values" that 
a sense of humor can achieve. Christianity is a religion of joy, and amusement 
is enjoyable; ergo, Christians should endorse amusement. Christianity is pro 
health and healing, and laughter is at least as good for you as jogging and 
Brussels sprouts. (We think of Norman Cousins getting healed by yukking it 
up over Charley Chaplin.) A sense of humor about ourselves can liberate us 
from narcissism and depression and self-pity and other evils, giving us a 
healthy "objectivity" about ourselves. This in tum makes us better compan-
ions: and good communal life is, after all, an important Christian value. 
I think we can do better than talk vaguely of Christian "values" and of how 
humor, also vaguely conceived, fosters these. We all know about spiritually 
dubious senses of humor: Humor can be malicious, racist, sacrilegious, sexist, 
"sick," silly and trivial; and we might suspect that people who enjoy these 
in a big way tend to be malicious, racist, sacrilegious, sexist, "sick," silly and 
trivial people. If a sense of humor is a Christian virtue, it should have some 
special features in consequence of its fitting into the Christian personality.3 
On the other hand, Christian amusement will also have some features that all 
amusement has. 
I shall look at five characteristics of amusement and ask what implications 
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the Christian life has, with respect to each feature, for the shape of a Christian 
sense of humor. The five characteristics of amusement that I'll examine are 
1) perception of incongruity, 2) perspectivity, 3) dissociation, 4) freshness, 
and 5) enjoyment. A distinctively Christian sense of humor is one that is 
shaped by the Christian narratives and their concepts. Two of its character-
istics in particular justify regarding it as a virtue4 alongside such other Chris-
tian virtues as gratitude, hope, and compassion. First, it is a capacity for 
"vision" or "perception" of Christianly important incongruities in oneself and 
others; as such it is a form of Christian discernment and supports whatever 
other Christian virtues depend on such discernment. Second, when directed 
towards oneself, a Christian sense of humor is a form of humility. While 
virtually any morality might generate a distinctive sense of humor, Christian 
theology/psychology is especially prone to this because it promotes a disso-
ciation between one's actual character and one's true character. I shall also 
point out how humor forms a natural bridge to Christianity for many non-be-
lievers and half-hearted Christians and how, typical of virtues, a Christian 
sense of humor cannot be a virtue unless it is allied with other traits. 
1. Perception of Incongruity 
It is fairly widely acknowledged among philosophers of humor that amuse-
ment' occurs characteristically in response to perception of incongruities, that 
is, the construal of something in terms of something else that fits oddly. 
There are competing views, such as Hobbes's "superiority" theory and 
Freud's "relief" theory, but I think that John Morreall has adequately an-
swered them, and will not here go into the debate myself.6 To have a sense 
of humor is to be especially prone to perceive incongruities of one sort or 
another. It is the business of the humorist to present his or her material in 
such a way that the incongruities become vivid. To this end the humorist is 
an artist in the management of vocabulary, vocal inflection, set-up, timing, 
facial expression, bodily posture, and whatever else it takes. Just about any 
kind of incongruity can be funny, as long as it captures people's interest and 
is not too painful. Funny incongruities almost invariably have some connec-
tion with human life, because that is what interests us most. 
The antics of chimpanzees are comical to us because they look at once 
human and non-human. To see them as funny is almost invariably to see them 
as pseudo-humans; if we see them simply as normal chimpanzees (something 
difficult to do on short acquaintance), they do not look funny to us. Carica-
tures are funny because they both look like their subject and yet exaggerate 
. certain features incongruously; through exaggerating features that are already 
somewhat incongruous, the good caricaturist brings out what is comical (that 
is, incongruous) in the subject himself. My brother used to speak fluent 
German with a perfect hick-Kansas accent; it was practically unintelligible 
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to Germans, but to those who knew both German and hick-Kansas the effect 
was hilarious. This also functions as a caricature of some Americans speaking 
German. Erma Bombeck's title "I Lost Everything in the Post-Natal Depres-
sion," like other puns, is funny by virtue of suggesting, by context, an incon-
gruous sense of a word. When one philosopher diagnoses another as suffering 
from "hardening of the categories," the utterance is comical because of the 
incongruous application of the medical vocabulary to a non-medical context 
(produced by the similarity of sound between "category" and "artery"), with 
the suggestion that categorial rigidity is a sort of disease. When Oscar Wilde 
says "Life is much too important to be taken seriously," this true comment 
on the impropriety of lugubriousness is funny because it seems to contradict 
the truism that important things are the ones that ought to be taken seriously. 
What has this to do with Christianity? While all the above can be "good 
clean fun," and are certainly not incompatible with Christianity, there is 
nothing essentially Christian about them. (In the appropriate setting the quip 
from Wilde and the philosophical joke might be placed in the service of 
Christian insight, but the setting would have to provide what was distinctively 
Christian.) But Christianity is a perspective from which certain important 
incongruities become visible. One Christian type of comic perception is ex-
emplified in a passage from Thomas Merton, who reports that Buggy Jer-
wood, chaplain of Oakham school in Merton's time, used to preach on I Cor. 
13, confusing a Christian concept. 
The boys listened tolerantly to these thoughts. But I think St Peter and the 
twelve Apostles would have been rather surprised at the concept that Christ 
had been scourged and beaten by soldiers, cursed and crowned with thorns 
and subjected to unutterable contempt and finally nailed to the Cross and left 
to bleed to death in order that we might all become gentlemen.' 
Merton notes that "the boys listened tolerantly to these thoughts." Presumably 
none of them found Mr. Jerwood's sermons amusing in the way that Merton 
did at the time of writing. And the reason, probably, was that they were not 
sufficiently developed as Christians for the distinction between behaving like 
a gentleman and exemplifying Christian love to be salient for them. As a 
consequence, they did not perceive the ludicrousness of someone's preaching 
mere gentlemanliness from a Christian pulpit and in the Christian vocabulary. 
Merton brings out the humor in this by sharply juxtaposing the incongruous 
pair: the pathos of the Christian salvation story and the concept of a gentle-
man. It is to the credit of Merton's Christian discernment that he now finds 
the spectacle of Mr. Jerwood's preaching amusing, and to the credit of his 
skill as a humorist that he can amuse us with what amuses him. Whatever we 
might want to say about Merton's capacity to be amused by puns from 
Bombeck and quips from Wilde, it seems clear that his capacity to be amused 
by the likes of Mr. Jerwood is something very much like a Christian vi(tue. 
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It is a form of discernment conditioned by the Christian story and its catego-
ries. But it is more than an "intellectual" discernment; it is a kind of percep-
tion (see section 4 below). 
The incongruity in the behavior of Buggy Jerwood is just one instance of 
an endless supply of incongruities in human action and demeanor which 
become visible to one who looks upon the world with Christian eyes. The 
sight of kings and presidents and corporate executives and university profes-
sors strutting about as though they are indispensable to the well-being of the 
human race becomes laughable when projected against the vision of a sov-
ereign God who gives and takes power as he will, and by whose grace alone 
those live who live. The very concept of a "moral majority" is a scream when 
seen from the perspective of a people whose history is that of at most a sinful 
but believing minority. The sight of myself trying to make my life completely 
safe with insurance policies and check-ups and retirement systems and health 
food and jogging becomes ridiculous if I acknowledge that I am like the 
withering grass and that God alone is the source of my security. On someone 
who feels self-righteous because he gives 15% of his gross income to charity 
a ludicrous light is cast by considering that he is not an owner, but only a 
steward of it anyway. If I believe that whatever I possess I have because God 
has welcomed me into his family, then I satirize myself if I try to gain 
importance by becoming very learned and having a fat list of publications. 
And so on. 
To become a Christian is to inherit the wherewithal for an exponential 
increase in the number of important incongruities one can see, and thus for 
comical impressions of the "world." Perhaps this explains in part why 
Kierkegaard called Christianity "the most humorous view of life in world-
history." 
The above characterizations may fail to strike someone as funny, and if 
they do fail, it is worth asking why. I can think of two possible explanations. 
One is that I am not a very good humorist, and so have not presented them 
in such a way as to make vivid the incongruities I mention. To do so really 
well would require artistry, and probably also more verbal space than the 
one-liners I have devoted to them. The other possibility is that the person 
fails to find them funny because he doesn't have a taste for that kind of 
humor-after all, there are people who don't have a taste for sick humor, 
black humor, racist humor, or whatnot. Surely there are people who just lack 
a taste for Christian humor. What would it be to lack a taste for this kind of 
humor? This question leads to a discussion of the second major characteristic 
of humor. 
2. Perspectivity 
My discussion of incongruity has assumed that perception of incongruity is 
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not just a function of the eyeballs, so to speak, but is a mental event of "perceiv-
ing" one thing in terms of another,· two things that fit oddly together. In each 
of my illustrations of Christian humor, the incongruity is between a piece of 
what we might call "pagan" behavior, thought, or emotion, and a distinctively 
Christian view of things. In Christian humor the Christian view of things is taken 
to be "normal," and the "pagan" behavior, thought, or emotion appears laugh-
able, ludicrous, ridiculous, etc., from this perspective. It is equally possible, and 
has of course often happened, that the order of the incongruity is reversed, and 
that what is distinctively Christian looks weird, odd, incongruous, bizarre, ab-
surd, laughable, etc., from the "pagan" perspective. 
A sense for the normal is basic to any sense of humor. You won't find 
anything funny if you don't consider anything to be normal, and this sense 
for the normal is what constitutes a person's perspective. But I think we can 
go a little deeper than this, and ask what sort of thing this sense for the normal 
is. The traditional Christian may answer that it is Christian beliefs-beliefs 
in the sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of man, the doctrine of grace, the 
stewardship of man, the kingdom of God-that provide this sense of the 
normal which is at the basis of Christian amusement. 
But this response is given the lie by a look at some examples of more 
everyday humor. Many pieces of humor are funny only from the perspective 
of someone who speaks a given language. Take for example Erma Bombeck's 
title that I mentioned earlier: "I Lost Everything in the Post-Natal Depres-
sion." The sense of the normal required for appreciating this joke is a sense 
for two meanings of 'depression': depression as a mood that frequently comes 
over new mothers, and depression as a period of economic world history in 
which many people lost everything. Any language that does not possess just 
this ambiguity in one of its terms will not make a very good translation of 
this joke. If you try to explain this joke to a foreigner who does not speak 
English very well, it is unlikely that she will be struck with the full force of 
it. If you tell her that in our language 'depression' has these two meanings, 
she will be able to see that there is something funny here, that the natives 
laugh at. But unless she has extraordinary powers of linguistic empathy, she 
will not be struck by this joke the way a native speaker is. The reason is that 
she lacks what I am calling the sense of the normal from which vantage point 
this line appears incongruous. But obviously the sense of the normal here is 
not provided by the belief that the word 'depression' has such-and-such 
meanings. The foreigner believes that as well as the native speaker. The 
difference between them is rather that the native speaker has a "feel" for the 
word which allows him to be struck by the incongruity of its being used in 
these two very different senses at the same time. This has little to do with 
believing something about the word, and a lot to do with having lived in the 
language for a while. By analogy one might suggest that the sense of the 
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normal required for Christian humor is less a function of Christian beliefs, 
and more a function of a "feel" for. the Christian categories. Some believers 
might be deficient in this "feel," while some unbelievers might have it, and 
in both cases the "feel" (or lack thereof) will result from how people have 
lived, in a very broad sense of 'lived.' 
One might object that it isn't fair to argue from cases of silly pun-humor to 
cases of Christian humor. Maybe the perspective from which puns are appre-
ciated is no belief, but it doesn't follow that Christian amusement is not 
founded on beliefs. Against this objection, however, is a simple observation 
of religious fact: that some people who believe in the sovereignty of God, the 
kingdom of God, the sinfulness of man, and so forth, do not have much in the 
way of a Christian sense of humor; and that some people who do not believe 
in these things, but do have a "feel" for Christianity, are capable of appreci-
ating Christian humor when it is presented to them. Of course, the solidest 
mooring in the Christian "sense for the normal" would be to have the Christian 
beliefs, and also to "live" in these so thoroughly that one effortlessly sees the 
incongruities they make visible. But the beliefs are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for seeing the Christian incongruities.9 
I propose to distinguish between having a perspective, owning a perspec-
tive, and adopting a perspective. I use each of these expressions in a some-
what contrived sense. By 'adopt a perspective' I mean to make it, or allow 
it to be, operative in one's perception; but I do not want to stress the activity 
of making or allowing. In my sense of this word we adopt a perspective 
whenever it is activated in us, whether or not by consent. Thus in this sense 
we are adopting the perspective of English when amused by the title from 
Bombeck; we are adopting a "human" perspective when amused by the antics 
of some chimpanzees; we are adopting the perspectives of both American 
English and German when we laugh at someone speaking German with a 
hick-Kansas accent, etc. 
To have a perspective, on the other hand, is to be capable of adopting it; 
it is for that perspective to be available or accessible. To speak English is to 
have the perspective needed to appreciate the Bombeck title, but I may not, 
at some moment, be adopting that perspective, because I may be asleep or 
appreciating a Dutch pun. The perspective provided by my knowing English 
is not at the moment "engaged," so to speak. A person who has more than a 
zoo-trip acquaintance with chimpanzees may not always see them as pseudo 
humans, at which times she will not be adopting the perspective which makes 
them appear funny. But such a person may not have lost her capacity to see 
them from that perspective, and so she can be said to have that perspective, 
even if she does not adopt it very much. A person like this may be able, 
within certain limits, to adopt the perspective in question at will. For example, 
when she is working with her chimpanzees day-to-day they appear quite 
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"nonnal" to her, but when visitors come and point out the pseudo human 
character of some behavior, she is able to join them in taking again the 
"human" perspective, and thus in seeing the incongruity and being amused. 
If she has some interest in the psychology of aspect-switch, she may even sit 
in her chimp lab practicing switching back and forth between the "human" 
perspective and the other. 
A person owns a perspective when that perspective is natural and habitual, 
when he not only can adopt it, but fairly strongly tends to do so. If one speaks 
English well, one automatically owns the sense of the nonnal necessary to 
appreciate Bombeck's title. A person who grows in acquaintance with chim-
panzees will gradually cease to own the perspective from which they appear 
(in the typical way) incongruous, even if she does not cease to have this 
perspective. Their behavior will come to seem nonnal, and not just the human 
behavior of which theirs reminds us. 
We can now distinguish among kinds of people with respect to a Christian 
sense of humor. There will be people who do not have the Christian sense of 
the nonnal, people who have it but do not own it, and people who own it. 
The first group do not have a Christian sense of humor at all. We may be 
able to make them understand ("intellectually") why others find the remark 
from Merton funny, but they will not themselves find it funny. The second 
group are persons who would probably not on their own detect the humor in 
the concept of a moral majority, because they would not adopt the perspec-
tive, but once the incongruity is pointed out to them, especially by an able 
humorist, they adopt the perspective and are amused. The third group are 
ones for whom the Christian sense of the normal is so natural that they 
spontaneously or "primitively" perceive the incongruity of, say, feeling self-
righteous·for giving away 15% of one's income or of trying to secure one's 
life through insurance and check-ups. It seems obvious that the people in the 
third group are the ones who have most thoroughly imbibed Christianity. 
Their sense of humor is "deeply" Christian, and has every right, it seems to 
me, to be called a Christian virtue. 
But it is the second group to which most of us belong, whether we are 
Christians or not. We are not so thoroughly and primitively entrenched in the 
Christian perspective that we spontaneously generate Christian amusement, 
but the perspective is more or less available to us, so we can "get into it" 
enough to be amused when a Merton or a Kierkegaard or a Chesterton points 
out the relevant incongruities. If we sit down and make the effort, we may 
even be able, rather unspontaneously, to construct a bit of Christian humor 
ourselves. 
It seems to me very significant that one can adopt the Christian perspective 
without owning it. This means that Christian humor is accessible to a wider 
audience than that of Christian saints. It is accessible to halfway Christians 
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like most of us in the pews, as well as to persons with no commitment 
whatsoever to Christianity, provided that they have enough empathic imagi-
nation, experience of life, training in cognate world-views, or whatever it 
takes, to be able to adopt this perspective which is not properly theirs. Chris-
tian humor is thus a window on Christianity for those who are not fully 
Christians, in exactly the way that malicious humor is a window on malice 
for those who are not committed to malice. It is an access to virtues and vices 
that are not ours, a way of transcending our own character. In the previous 
section I claimed that a Christian sense of humor is a virtue because it is a 
form of vision or Christian discernment. The present section has led us to see 
the capacity for being amused by Christian humor (and this is less than a 
fully saintly sense of humor) as a form of freedom or potential for self-tran-
scendence toward the things of the Spirit. This is not a Christian virtue, but 
we might call it a quasi-virtue, or a virtue potential. It is certainly a stage on 
the way to fully Christian virtues. 
Laughing from an alien perspective is not merely an exercise of the imag-
ination, as it were, but something closer to a genuine participation in the 
Christian perspective. To understand this, and its ethical significance, we 
must explore the remaining dimensions of amusement. 
3. Dissociation 
When I find something humorous, I dissociate myself from it, even if what 
I am laughing at is my friend, my children, my lover, or myself. Dissociation 
is determined by the two facts about amusement that I have just expounded: 
that it is a perception of incongruity from a perspective which is a sense for 
the normal. To see the chimpanzees' antics as incongruous is to see them as 
something different from my "own," those of my own kind. To laugh at 
someone speaking German with a hick-Kansas accent is to say, as it were, "I 
know that's not how it's really done." If we laugh at Oscar Wilde's remark 
that "life is much too important to be taken seriously," it is because we do 
not take it seriously-not, that is, as a literal formula for the truth it expresses. 
To laugh at Buggy lerwood's confusion of (X'Yeut'1 and gentlemanliness im-
plies that we view that confusion as alien to our own minds. To be amused 
is not to dissociate myself from everything about the "object" of amqsement. 
The chimpanzees may be cherished pets, and Buggy lerwood may be my best 
friend; and I may acknowledge truth in Wilde's wild remarks. When I laugh 
at myself, I certainly do not experience complete self-alienation. But I do 
dissociate myself from what I perceive to be incongruous; this follows from 
the concept of seeing something as incongruous. 
This fact is significant for our analysis. For it means that when I laugh as 
a Christian (whether or not I am one) I "see," at least for the moment, the 
pagan perspective as alien. This is natural enough in the case where the 
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laugher at Christian humor is a Christian; it is natural for her to be dissociated 
from the pagan sense of the normal. But this dissociation becomes interesting 
where the laugher at Christian humor is not a Christian, or is that partial sort 
of Christian that most Christians are-one for whom the Christian sense of 
the normal, though accessible, is not very natural. When one is amused at 
something that normally seems normal, one is getting a striking glimpse of 
"another world." Christian humor is, you might say, on the borderline between 
Christianity and "paganism." For you don't have to be a Christian to enjoy it, 
and yet to enjoy it is to dissociate yourself, at least momentarily, from your 
habitual non-Christian perspective. Thus among pagans (whether or not they 
are church-going) Christian humor is a destabilizing influence. 
Let us imagine that Merton was able to get Buggy lerwood laughing, along 
with the rest of us, at his confusion. This would take some finesse, preciseiy 
because humor is dissociative. When somebody else laughs at us, we know 
that he is not 100% "with" us-unless, of course, we are laughing at ourselves 
and thus laughing with him, in which case we are not 100% "with" ourselves, 
either. We feel that laughter directed at us, even if completely lacking in scorn 
or derision or contempt, alienates us from the laugher. We feel pushed away, 
set apart as something that doesn't belong; and we want to belong. So we don't 
like being laughed at, and a humorist who sets out, in the interest of Christianity, 
to dissociate pagans from their paganism, will need to employ a subtle art. 
One way will be to communicate as much as possible to Buggy that he is 
being laughed at as a friend, as one to whom we are bound with the bonds 
of affection. This mitigates his sense of alienation from the humorist, making 
it easier for him to accept the alienation from his own viewpoint, and thus to 
start laughing at himself. The less the humor sounds like sarcasm, and the 
more like friendly fun, the better. Another strategy is to get him laughing, 
not directly at himself, but at somebody like himself. For those of us who 
have preached lerwoodish sermons from time to time, it is easier to laugh at 
Buggy than to laugh at ourselves, and yet laughing at Buggy can serve a 
similar purpose: of dissociating us from the practice of making lerwoodish 
sermons. The Archie Bunker Show represented Archie's racial and ethnic 
bigotry in a consistently comic light, and thus served the moral purpose of 
dissociating bigots from their bigotry by the complicity of their own laughter. 
I am sure the laughter (and the associated dissociation) came more easily for 
Archie's having played the scapegoat, than it would have if each of those 
bigots out there on the end of a boobtube were subjected, individually, to 
comic ridicule. 
But some people are able to laugh at their own foibles without the mitiga-
tion of deflecting the laughter against a scapegoat. They are less "defensive," 
better able to tolerate being represented as incongruous, because they have a 
kind of dissociation built into their character-structure. Since they do not 
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entirely "identify" with the ridiculous side of them, they are more or less 
comfortable with being ridiculous. In many virtues-systems, there is no sys-
tematic conceptual resource for this dissociation (think of Aristotle, stoicism, 
secular humanism); the individual's sense of his own identity as a person just 
is more or less his sense of whatever his character is. So if he is to have the 
self-confidence to laugh at momentous aspects of his own behavior and char-
acter, it must be on the basis of either deception (maybe self-deception) or 
of some personal achievement by comparison with which the incongruities 
seem to him less significant. 
But this is not so in Christianity. Christian psychology, as per the Apostle 
Paul, strongly promotes dissociation from even the most momentous aspects 
of our character, thus opening the way for a sense of humor as a Christian 
virtue. For the Christian scheme acknowledges forthrightly that people (all 
people) are incongruous with their telos (and you won't find a more momen-
tous incongruity than that.'), while at the same time those who believe in 
Christ are justified, reborn, have a new nature, etc., which is not thus incon-
gruous. Here we have, as it were, two identities: we are what our character 
is, but beyond this and preeminently we are what God deems us to be and 
destines us to be; and God's deeming and destining are gracious in Christ. 
We are sinners, but at the same time righteous by Christ's identifying with 
us and dwelling in us. We live by his sustaining grace, and not by our own 
strength. When this dissociation of our true identity from our foible-identity 
is deeply actualized in the individual personality, it emerges as humility. For 
humility is the power to be happy and "self"-confidentIO despite some form 
or other of deficiency, inferiority, or defect. If "deep" humor has mostly to 
do with human defect-with a person's incongruity respecting his or her telos 
as human-then it would seem that humility goes hand in hand with a sense 
of humor about oneself. The Christian theme of dissociation in the "spiritual" 
person is surely another justification for Kierkegaard's comment that Chris-
tianity is the most humorous view of life in world-history. The Christian way 
of conceiving persons allows, in a specially felicitous way, for that humility 
without which a person cannot direct important humor against himself. On 
the other hand, amusement at one's own foibles is an especially powerful 
form of self-dissociation, and thus of humility. If a Christian sense of humor 
is a capacity for seeing spiritual incongruities with one's own eyes, and it is 
important to be able to see those incongruities not just in the "world," but in 
oneself, then a Christian sense of humor is a deep form of self-knowledge 
and surely, thus, a Christian virtue. 
4. Freshness 
To be amused by something is to be struck with some incongruity respect-
ing it. When amused by the antics of the chimpanzees, I see the incongruity 
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in their behavior. This is to be sharply contrasted with merely believing or 
judging that their behavior differs in specific ways from that of humans, or 
even knowing this. I can come to know how their behavior differs by reading 
a scientific book on chimpanzee behavior, but this is quite different from the 
appreciation of the incongruity involved in amusement, which is a direct 
(though of course perspectival) perception. We can imagine someone reading 
scientific books on the subject for fifty years, without in this very human way 
experiencing the contrast between chimpanzees and humans. Of course the 
scientific approach is in some ways superior to being amused by chimpan-
zees: I may be amused without being very articulate about the differences, 
or having any explanation of them, and the scientific book may be just what 
I need to become articulate and explanatory. And the two may be combined: 
Scientific investigation may give saliency to differences which in their turn 
become amusing, and amusement might provoke scientific investigation. 
I use the word 'freshness' for this dimension of amusement because it 
comes out most clearly in cases where (because of its absence) we are inclined 
to say that the humor has gone "stale" for a person. Good jokes have staying 
power, but I suppose any piece of humor can go stale if repeated enough. If 
I repeat "Life is much too important to be taken seriously" 100 times a week 
in various contexts, it is likely to lose its punch for me after a while. The 
theory of humor that I am offering explains this loss of freshness as a loss of 
perspective. Wilde's unorthodox use of the word 'seriously' begins to sound 
normal, and so the perception of incongruity disappears. It is not that I have 
ceased to know or believe or judge that this use of the word is incongruous, 
for if asked I can certainly explain why other people are laughing at it; but 
I have ceased to hear it as incongruous, and so have ceased being amused 
myself. Of course there are ways that my sensitivity to the humor may be 
resurrected even after death by repetition. In particular it is effective to share 
the humor with someone who can really appreciate it; it is as though by 
empathy with my hearer I am freshly reestablished in the needed perspective. 
My point in this section is just that amusement has this character of percep-
tion: to be amused is to "hear" for oneself, to "see" for oneself, some incon-
gruity or other. 
Christian amusement too is a vision of the incongruities in human behavior, 
taking the Christian perspective. Flannery O'Connor's very funny and deeply 
Christian story "Revelation"l1 is not only about a "revelation" of sinfulness 
and fundamental human equality to the bigoted and self-satisfied Mrs. Turpin; 
it is also a "revelation" to the reader who is amused at Mrs. Turpin's com-
placent gratitude to Jesus for making her just who she is, neither white trash 
nor a nigger nor bad-dispositioned nor ugly, but instead a woman with a little 
of everything. In his amusement at Mrs. Turpin the reader sees the incongru-
ity of her bigotry and self-satisfaction. Insofar as such Christian virtues as 
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compassion, contrition, gratitude, hope, and humility presuppose (or at least 
are fostered by) the ability to see the incongruity in bigotry and conceit (and 
not just the belief or knowledge that these are incongruous), amusement at 
Mrs. Turpin functions as an exercise in Christian virtues. 
In the section on perspectivity I pointed out that we can be amused by 
humor whose sense of the normal is not properly our "own." This means that 
humor is an access to other perspectives, as long as they are not too distant 
from one's own: non-sadists can enjoy sadistic humor, non-racists can enjoy 
racist humor, non-Aristotelians can enjoy Aristotelian humor, non-Christians 
can enjoy Christian humor. At the end of that section I commented that 
laughing from an alien perspective is not merely an intellectual exercise, but 
something nearer to a genuine participation in that perspective. Our discus-
sion of freshness puts us in a position to appreciate this point. For the par-
ticipation that I spoke of there can now be seen to be a deeply sympathetic 
"perception." To be amused by O'Connor's story12 is to put on, for the 
moment, Christian eyes and something like a Christian heart. I am not, of 
course, saying that everyone who properly laughs at O'Connor's story has 
the Christian virtue of a sense of humor; for that, presumably, one has to be 
a fairly highly developed Christian. But O'Connor's power as a humorist is 
her ability to enable us to visit the Christian perspective which to her, I 
suspect, is native territory and the basis of her Christian sense of humor. 
5. Enjoyment 
Of the five features of amusement around which I have organized this 
essay, I left the most obvious to the last. Amusement is pleasurable. I have 
two things to say about this. 
The moral significance of this fact is that humor draws or seduces us. When 
we laugh at Mrs. Turpin we dissociate ourselves from her, and consequently 
from that perspective in which it is quite normal to congratulate ourselves on 
being less trashy and stupid, and more civilized and compassionate and so-
phisticated, than some other people that we daily meet. If Mrs. Turpin's, rather 
than the Christian perspective, is our "own" (and I'd guess it probably is), this 
dissociation will be painful and something we probably won't volunteer for. 
And yet we gobble up the story like ice cream, subjecting ourselves to a 
disturbing alien vision and the frightening possibility of sanctification. This is 
what I mean by ·seduction,' and it is a great moral power of moral humor. It 
is equally, I might add, a great power of immoral humor. 
Throughout this paper a worry may have nagged the reader's mind. It is no 
doubt an error to exclude all fun from the Christian life, but the kind of fun 
that I have claimed for a sense of humor as a Christian virtue seems to be 
especially perverse. For I have claimed that a sense of humor is a disposition 
to enjoy some range of incongruities, and that a Christian sense of humor is 
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especially a disposition to enjoy spiritual incongruities-incongruities between 
a person's nature as a child of the gospel on the one hand, and his attitudes and 
behavior on the other. Buggy Jerwood and Mrs. Turpin are comic figures because 
of their failure in one respect or another as children of God. Can one possibly 
be displaying a Christian virtue in laughing at that sort of thing? 
The answer to this question lies in applying the "unity of the virtues" thesis. 
In its stronger form, this thesis claims that a person cannot have one virtue 
without having all of them. In a weaker form, it claims that some traits cannot 
be virtues if separated from certain others. I shall only claim here that the 
weaker form is true. Being amused at somebody's failure as a human being 
could not exemplify a virtue13 if that were the only attitude one had toward 
her. But in the Christian personality a sense of humor is grammatically con-
nected with other virtues such as compassion and hope. We can assume (I 
hope) that Merton's amusement at Buggy Jerwood's confusion about cxYCX1tTJ 
was suffused with that sense of common humanity and common dependence 
on the grace of God that Christians call compassion; for if it wasn't, the 
grammar of the Christian virtues declares that the amusement was not a 
display of a Christian sense of humor. The grammatical connection, very 
roughly and briefly, is that the kingdom which provides the perspective from 
which certain behaviors and attitudes appear incongruous is the object of 
Christian hope and the model of Christian compassion. 
There would be something malicious or at any rate unacceptably frivolous 
in the enjoyment of people's failures to achieve true humanity if that were 
the end of the story-if, say, we believe that people are just fundamentally 
screwed up and then die. 
This would be tragedy, not comedy. But the Christian believes in an un-
speakable future glory for God's creatures by comparison with which the 
present defects of his children fade into insignificance. These "tragic" incon-
gruities, which are the subject matter of Christian humor, are thus temporary, 
and situated by Christian laughter in the larger context of God's mercy and 
healing. It is because Christians are hopers that they can also be laughers 
about the most serious things in life. In Flannery O'Connor's story Mrs. 
Turpin does indeed end by having a "revelation" of the fundamental equality 
of herself with all the humans she had scorned, and thus a foreshadowing of 
her rebirth. So we can read the story as a symbol which says that if you're 
going to laugh at the likes of Mrs. Turpin you'd better remember that you're 
laughing at yourself too, and that to the enjoyment of laughter is to be added 
the joy of hope in God that these incongruities, at any rate, are not eternal. 14 
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